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THE ANOMALOUS ISSUE CLASS
Veniamin Privalov*
INTRODUCTION
The modern class action is a litigation superstar.1 The device’s potential
for opening the courthouse doors to “small people,” holding big business
accountable, and enacting sweeping reform is second to none.2 In recent
years, however, the star has waned.3 Judicial hostility has made it harder for
plaintiffs to certify a class while making it easier for defendants to avoid class
actions entirely.4 Certifying a mass tort class has become nearly impossible.5
Plaintiff lawyers’ creative attempts to work around these roadblocks have
been shut down one after another by the Supreme Court.6
It is in this scorched mass litigation landscape that commentators and
lower courts alike are increasingly turning to a once controversial tool—Rule
23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23(c)(4)” or
“(c)(4)”).7 The proponents of an expansive reading of this subsection argue
that it empowers courts to certify “issue classes” with the aim to adjudicate
only those issues that are common to the class, before leaving the plaintiffs
to litigate their individual issues separately in other forums.8 Notably, the
proponents of this reading maintain that a (c)(4) issue class may be certified
even when the claim, viewed as a whole, would fail the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).9 This has been referred to as the issue class
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1. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013) (“To anyone interested in buccaneering
attorneys, maverick judges, mind-boggling settlement sums, idealistic lawyering, or base legal
corruption, the [current era of class action litigation has] yielded a rich harvest.”).
2. See id. at 599–600, 606–09.
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that only
damages incidental to injunctive relief are allowed under 23(b)(2)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1999) (holding that certification of a 23(b)(1)(B) “limited fund” class was not
available when the “fund” available to plaintiffs had been artificially capped).
7. See infra Part II.A (noting the current dominance of the expansive view of (c)(4)).
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.A.
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“end-run.”10 For reasons discussed in Part III, this Comment refers to issue
classes enabled by the predominance end-run as “anomalous issue classes.”
This Comment seeks to contribute to the current discourse regarding the
proper interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) and the propriety of the issue class endrun. While the expansive reading of (c)(4) is currently dominant,11 the Fifth
Circuit and some commentators have rejected it in favor of a “limited”
reading that views the subsection as a “housekeeping tool” designed to make
already certifiable classes more manageable, rather than an independent
ground for class certification.12
Part I of this Comment briefly explores the origins of the class action
device, its transformation into—and rise to prominence as—the modern class
action under the revised Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule 23”), and some of the decisions that have led to its recent downfall.
Part II then outlines the arguments for both the expansive and limited
interpretations of (c)(4). Lastly, Part III sides with the limited view,
reiterating some of the arguments laid out in Part II before positing that the
anomalous issue class is irreconcilable with centuries of class action practice,
and that its continued use has the potential to cause widespread harm to
litigants and enact an end-run around much more than just predominance.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
An understanding of the structure and history of Rule 23 and the class
action device is essential to fully appreciate the animating forces behind the
current push for an expansive (c)(4), as well as the arguments to follow. Part
I.A explores the common law roots of the class action device and the motives
behind its development. Part I.B then introduces Rule 23 and its role in
creating the “modern class action.” Lastly, Part I.C charts the decline of the
modern class action, focusing on the major developments which have
chipped away at the reach and power of the device.
A. The Origins of the Class Action Device
The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”13
Originally developed as part of the English common law, the device was the
equity courts’ response to a self-imposed problem.14 Seeking to avoid the
multiplicity of proceedings common in courts of law at the time, equity courts
imposed a compulsory joinder rule requiring all parties “materially
interested” in the proceedings to be made parties to the case, so that they

10. See generally Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY
L.J. 709, 709–10 (2003).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).
14. See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:12 (5th ed. 2021).
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could be bound by a unitary decree.15 Realizing, however, that strict
adherence to the rule—particularly in cases where joining all materially
interested parties was not feasible—could give rise to injustice, the courts
developed the “bill of peace,” a form of class action by which one person
could bring a suit on behalf of others similarly situated that would be binding
on the whole class.16 To bring a bill of peace, the plaintiff had to “establish
[(1)] that the number of people involved was so large as to make joinder
impossible or impracticable, [(2)] that the members of the group possessed a
joint interest in the question to be adjudicated, and [(3)] that the named
parties adequately represented those absent from the action.”17
Justice Story—building upon the doctrines developed by the English
courts—is generally credited with having formulated the class action
standards in America in his West v. Randall18 opinion.19 Story’s reasoning
was then adopted20 by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Swormstedt.21 Similar
principles were codified in the Federal Equity Rules.22 When law and equity
were merged in 1938, the same underlying concepts formed the basis of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.23
B. Rule 23 and the Modern Class Action
The first version of Rule 23 became effective in 1938, along with the rest
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 However, that original iteration
of the Rule proved deficient.25 The structure it laid out provided for three
types of class actions—“true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious”—distinguished by
the type of “jural” relationship involved.26 A true class action was reserved
for cases where a “joint, or common, or secondary” right was alleged.27 A
hybrid class was designed to aggregate individually-held or “several” rights
for reasons of equitable treatment.28 Lastly, the spurious action joined
several rights without an equitable connection.29 The true and hybrid classes
were mandatory classes capable of binding all absent class members, while
the spurious class functioned on an opt-in basis.30
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 7A MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (4th ed. 2021).
18. 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820).
19. See 7A KANE, supra note 17, at § 1751.
20. See id.
21. 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
22. See Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class
Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 257 (2002).
23. See id.
24. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 600–01; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1028 (1982).
25. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 600–01.
26. Id. at 600 (quoting James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL.
L. REV. 307, 310 (1938)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 600–01.
30. Id. at 601.
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While the intricacies of the original Rule 23 are beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is easy to see from the brief description above why even
contemporary commentators have called it “[t]heoretically anachronistic and
cumbersome in application.”31 In 1950, a mere twelve years after the Rule
became effective, academics were already decrying its phraseology and
structure, as well as its “outworn categories of rights.”32 Beyond mere
inconvenience, the cumbersome structure of the original Rule made it
difficult for courts to realize the full potential of Hansberry v. Lee.33 Judicial
attempts to work around the Rule included recategorizing spurious suits as
true or hybrid,34 mandating lengthy opt-in periods designed to maximize
class participation,35 and practically defying the Rule’s constraints in the
context of desegregation.36
The stage was thus set for a new, more straightforward and pragmatic Rule
23, which would usher in the era of the modern class action.37 After a failed
first effort in the mid-1950s and the subsequent disbanding of the Advisory
Committee, a new Committee was created by the Supreme Court in 1960.38
Eschewing the true/hybrid/spurious classifications, the new Rule was drafted
with a focus on adequate representation and class solidarity as the
touchstones for aggregate treatment.39 In 1966, the new Rule, which would
31. Id.
32. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 245 (1950). “Most lawyers
and judges,” Chafee argues, “are no longer accustomed to think in this way.” Id. at 245–46.
Likewise, in one of his opinions, Judge Charles Clark described the Rule’s labels as
“euphonious, if mystic.” Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 978 (2d Cir. 1952).
33. 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (holding that absent class members may be bound so long
as they are adequately represented); see also Arthur John Keeffe et al., Lee Defeats Ben Hur,
33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 339 (1948) (arguing that Hansberry was an invitation for Congress to
do something about the “spurious” class).
34. See Burnham, 197 F.2d at 979 (“The convenient use of the appellations ‘true,’
‘hybrid,’ and ‘spurious’ for determining the effect of a judgment in a class suit under F.R.
23(a) has become rather genera.”); see also 2 PROCEEDINGS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 246 (Mar. 25, 1954) (comments of Charles Clark), in RECORDS OF
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/
CV03-1954-min-Vol2.pdf [https://perma.cc/USL8-HR22] (“I think we solved it
beautifully . . . . We just changed the label. We called it a hybrid class suit and said that what
[the district judge] had done was correct . . . .”).
35. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588–90 (10th Cir. 1961)
(permitting class members to opt in even after a favorable verdict had been rendered).
36. Compare Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1953) (“Violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment are of course violations of individual or personal rights . . . .”), with
Bush v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962) (concluding that the rights
belong to the schoolchildren as a class “irrespective of any individual’s right to be admitted
on a non-racial basis to a particular school”). See also David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV.
657, 678–91 (2011) (chronicling and explaining this shift).
37. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 588 (“The current era of class action litigation began on
July 1, 1966, when a newly-revised Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
effect.”).
38. See id. at 602–04.
39. TOPIC EE: TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CLASS
ACTIONS—RULE 23, at EE–2 (1962), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
microformed on CIS No. CI-6309-44 (Cong. Info Serv.).
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radically alter the class action landscape, was unleashed upon the legal
world.40
The structure laid out by the 1966 amendments remains largely unchanged
to this day.41 Subsection (a)42 of the modern Rule 23 lays out four “necessary
but not sufficient conditions for a class action”43: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation.44 Subsection (b) then sets forth
the three permissible categories of class action.45 Rule 23(b)(1)—the class
action equivalent of necessary party joinder under Rule 1946—applies when
individual actions would create a risk of incompatible judgments, or would
substantially impair the interests of other identically situated class
members.47 Rule 23(b)(2) provides a mechanism for pursuing class-wide
injunctive or declaratory relief48 in cases where the “appropriate final relief”
does not relate “exclusively or primarily to money damages.”49 Lastly,
23(b)(3),50 the most “adventuresome”51 of the provisions and the main focus
of this Comment, sets up a notice and opt-out class action catch-all, allowing
claim types not covered by either (b)(1) or (b)(2) to be certified—so long as
40. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 588.
41. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 746
(2013) (“The Rule 23(a) and (b) criteria, by their terms, have not changed in any significant
way since 1966.”).
42. Rule 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (subdivision (a)).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
45. Id. at 23(b). One of the three categories of 23(b) must be satisfied in addition to all of
the prerequisites of 23(a). See id.
46. See Laura J. Hines, Codifying the Issue Class Action, 16 NEV. L.J. 625, 629 (2016).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
48. Id. at 23(b)(2).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (subdivision (b)(2)).
50. Rule 23(b)(3) states:
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
51. See generally Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
497 (1969).
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the subsection’s requirements are met.52 While 23(b)(3) is the most obvious
path to money damages,53 litigants seeking to take advantage of this
subsection must show—in addition to the requirements of 23(a)—that issues
common to the class “predominate” over individual issues and that the class
action is “superior” to other adjudicative mechanisms.54 Despite these
additional hurdles, the allure of money damages made (b)(3)’s domination of
the class action landscape inevitable.55
Unbeknownst to its authors,56 as early as 1964 events were already in
motion that would transform the humble Rule57 they were drafting into a
regulatory icon and staple of the federal courtroom.58 From Title VII, which
went into effect on July 2, 1964,59 rose the employment class action;60 the
holding of the 1964 case J.I. Case Co. v. Borak61 laid the groundwork for the
securities fraud class action;62 the American Law Institute’s 1965 publication
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its embrace of strict product liability
for product defects63 contributed to the mass tort class action; and finally, the
1960s public interest movement scored a “stunning” array of legislative
victories and produced a steady supply of public-spirited plaintiffs’ lawyers
eager to file class actions.64 The public’s growing mistrust of business,
coinciding with a decline of confidence in regulatory agencies, left Congress
with little choice but to turn to private rights of action—often enforced with
the help of Rule 23.65 These changes transformed class actions from a

52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
53. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“Given th[e]
structure [of Rule 23(b) class types], we think it clear that individualized monetary claims
belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, at § 4:47 (“Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions are money damages class actions.”).
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
55. See Hines, supra note 46, at 630 (“[I]t is quite simply where the money is.”).
56. While the Advisory Committee (“Committee”) members “seemed to have some sense
that their obscure rule would assume far greater importance going forward,” much of their
deliberations were dominated by technical procedural concerns rather than grand visions of
the Rule’s potential impact. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 608; see also Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,”
92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 (1979) (“The class action onslaught caught everyone, including
the draftsmen, by surprise.”).
57. See Miller, supra note 56, at 669 (“[The Advisory Committee] had few, if any,
revolutionary notions about its work product . . . . [T]he draftsmen conceived the procedure’s
primary function to be providing a mechanism for securing private remedies, rather than
deterring public wrongs or enforcing broad social policies.”).
58. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 606.
59. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
60. See Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private
Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225, 229 (1976).
61. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
62. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1314–15 (2008).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
64. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 607.
65. See id. at 607–08.
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“litigation backwater” into a courtroom Goliath.66 It was not long, however,
until Goliath met its David.
C. The Fall of the Modern Class Action
By the mid-1990s, judicial enthusiasm about the class action’s ability to
achieve mass justice67 had been eclipsed by concern over the pressure that
class certification applied on defendants to settle even meritless claims.68 A
critical development, and perhaps the tipping point, was Judge Posner’s
opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,69 granting mandamus and
reversing class certification in part because the potentially bankrupting classwide verdict put the defendant “under intense pressure to settle.”70 In the
wake of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, other federal circuits as well as the
Supreme Court issued important decisions curtailing class actions.71 These
decisions, in turn, “created a climate”72 for the adoption of Rule 23(f) and
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA),73 altering the procedural landscape
significantly by allowing defendants to secure a more friendly74 federal
forum much more frequently75 and providing them with a tool for immediate
appellate review of class certification orders.76
As a result of Rule 23(f) and CAFA, federal courts were able to hear more
cases, creating “troublesome” new standards for plaintiffs seeking class-wide
relief in the process.77 In the aftermath of Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines,
Inc.,78 for instance, the prevailing view that class certification could be based

66. See id. at 608.
67. See Owen W. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
21, 25 (1996).
68. See Klonoff, supra note 41, at 731; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig.,
552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009); Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended (Oct. 16, 2001)
(“[D]enying or granting class certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it
may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted
pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants) . . . .”).
69. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
70. Id. at 1298 (also noting that “Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called
settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action
‘blackmail settlements’” (internal citations omitted)).
71. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
72. Klonoff, supra note 41, at 733; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville:
Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 102 (2001) (“Judge Posner’s thoughtful
discussion of the problem in the Rhone-Poulenc opinion gave the Advisory Committee added
impetus to amend Rule 23 to provide a rule-based means for interlocutory appeal.”).
73. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
74. See Klonoff, supra note 41, at 743 (“[M]any of the most egregious examples of class
action abuse had occurred in the state courts, often by elected judges who favored class
members over large, out-of-state corporations.”).
75. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005; Klonoff, supra note 41, at 732–33.
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
77. Klonoff, supra note 41, at 745.
78. 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
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on pleadings or only minimal evidentiary support79 was displaced by a view
requiring resolution on the merits of issues that implicated the elements of
class certification.80 A growing number of decisions81 began turning on the
once lenient requirement of class ascertainability.82 Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor83 severely limited the availability of class certification in cases
involving personal injury claims.84 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes85
transformed the (a)(2) commonality requirement from “a low bar” into the
functional equivalent of (b)(3) predominance.86 Just two months prior, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,87 the same majority held that the Federal
Arbitration Act88 embodied “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements” and thereby preempted a state law that rendered broad class
action waivers unconscionable.89 Soon after, American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant90 extended Concepcion to federal claims and
expressly rejected the argument that class action waivers should be
invalidated where plaintiffs were effectively deprived of the opportunity to
vindicate their rights due to the prohibitive cost of individual litigation.91
Taken together, these decisions have left the class action a “wounded
beast.”92 One class action device, however, is “thriving.”93

79. See Klonoff, supra note 41, at 731 (listing cases).
80. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 582 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(noting that “every circuit to have considered this issue . . . has reached essentially the same
conclusion: Falcon’s central command requires district courts to ensure that Rule 23
requirements are actually met, not simply presumed from the pleadings”), rev’d on other
grounds, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
81. John H. Beisner et al., Ascertainability: Reading Between the Lines of Rule 23, 12
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 253 (2011), http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/
publications/Publications2371_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKM3-2T99].
82. See Klonoff, supra note 41, at 762 n.186.
83. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
84. See Donald R. Frederico, The Arc of Class Actions: A View from the Trenches, 32
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 266, 268–69 (2020).
85. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
86. See Frederico, supra note 84, at 270–71; Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (“What matters to
class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather,
the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.” (internal citations omitted)).
87. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1925).
89. See Frederico, supra note 84, at 272 (“In other words, even a contractual provision
barring class actions that state law had declared grossly unfair to the consumer could be
enforced because of a federal law passed in 1925, four decades before the amendments to Rule
23 that gave us the modern class action.”).
90. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
91. See Frederico, supra note 84, at 272; Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236 (“But the fact
that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
92. Frederico, supra note 84, at 266.
93. Hines, supra note 46, at 626.
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II. AFTER THE FALL: THE ONGOING DEBATE SURROUNDING RULE
23(C)(4)
Following the downfall of many of the staples of class certification, a
growing number of lawyers, judges, and academics have turned to Rule
23(c)(4)—formerly 23(c)(4)(A)94—in a bid to revitalize the class action
device and enact an “end-run”95 around the recent restrictions.96 The
eighteen-word section provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”97
The debate, and this Comment, focus on the interaction between (c)(4) and
the predominance requirement of (b)(3). The proponents of an expansive
reading of (c)(4) argue that the provision grants courts a broad power to
certify classes as to particular issues—even where the action as a whole fails
(b)(3) predominance.98 The proponents of a limited reading, on the other
hand, argue that (c)(4) is more akin to a “housekeeping” tool and that
predominance must always be satisfied as to the whole case.99
A. Broad Power: The Expansive Interpretation of (c)(4)
Over the course of the last two decades, the expansive (c)(4) has gone from
obscurity100 to near-complete dominance.101 This success has been achieved
through reliance on two primary arguments: the plain meaning and structure
of Rule 23,102 and the purpose behind the Rule’s enactment.103 Both are
discussed in turn.
Every analysis of a Federal Rule begins with its text.104 Some courts and
commentators have in turn argued that Rule 23(c)(4)’s directive may be
readily understood from the “plain meaning” of the text alone.105 The
94. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the question of issue class certification fell under Rule
23(c)(4)(A). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (2006) (repealed 2007). In 2007, subparts (A)
and (B) were removed, and the issue class provision was relabeled 23(c)(4). The change did
not alter the Rule’s substantive meaning. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s note to
2007 amendment (“Subdivisions have been rearranged within some rules to achieve greater
clarity and simplicity.”).
95. See generally Hines, supra note 10.
96. See, e.g., Patricia Bronte et al., Carving at the Joint: The Precise Function of Rule
23(c)(4), 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 745 (2013); Michael J. Wylie, In the Ongoing Debate Between
the Expansive and Limited Interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), Advantage
Expansivists, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 349 (2007); Romberg, supra note 22; Gates v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d
Cir. 2006).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
98. See Wylie, supra note 96, at 353–54.
99. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
100. See Romberg, supra note 22, at 253–54 (“[N]o scholarly commentator has addressed
issue certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in any depth whatsoever.”).
101. See Bronte et al., supra note 96, at 745–46 (explaining that almost every circuit to
have considered the issue has endorsed some form of the expansive view).
102. See In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006).
103. See Bronte et al., supra note 96, at 757–58.
104. See Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 730 (2014).
105. See Nassau Cnty., 461 F.3d at 226 (grounding an expansive interpretation of 23(c)(4)
in the provision’s “plain language”); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439
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Second Circuit’s holding in In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases106
provides a thorough exploration of this point. Looking to the pre-amendment
version of (c)(4),107 the court reasoned that the plain language of the Rule
requires a court to first identify the issues appropriate for certification and
then apply the other provisions of the Rule—including (b)(3)
predominance.108 In support of its interpretation, the court cited Gunnells v.
Healthplan Services, Inc.,109 in which the Fourth Circuit had reached the
same conclusion,110 as well as the Advisory Committee Notes.111 The Notes,
the court argued, state that a court may employ (c)(4) when “it is the only
way that a litigation retains its class character,” which, the court reasoned,
includes situations where common questions predominate only as to the
particular issues.112 Finally, the court argued that the limited view of (c)(4)
renders the subsection “virtually null,” a result which courts seek to avoid
when interpreting statutes,113 since under a limited reading of the subsection
a court could only use (c)(4) to manage cases that it had already determined
to be manageable without the use of (c)(4).114
The second point harkens back to Rule 1, which instructs that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed
by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”115 Likewise, the class action
mechanism is intended to “promote judicial economy and efficiency by
obviating the need for multiple adjudications of the same issues.”116 Indeed,
(4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting (c)(4) to issue an “express command” for certification of issue
class actions that “courts have no discretion to ignore”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions
and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional Approach
to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 1230 (2005) (asserting that the text
of Rule 23(c)(4) should “be accorded its plain meaning”).
106. 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
107. “When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (2006) (repealed 2007) (emphases added). The 2007
amendment streamlined the language but retained the meaning of this subsection. See supra
note 94.
108. See Nassau Cnty., 461 F.3d at 226.
109. 348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003).
110. See id. at 439 (“Thus, Rule 23 specifically dictates that ‘[w]hen appropriate’ a class
action may be ‘maintained’ as to ‘particular issues’ and, after that is done, ‘the provisions of
this rule,’ such as the predominance requirement of (b)(3), ‘shall then . . . be construed and
applied.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (2006) (repealed 2007))).
111. See Nassau Cnty., 461 F.3d at 226. With respect to subsection (c)(4), the notes set
forth that, “[f]or example, in a fraud or similar case the action may retain its ‘class’ character
only through the adjudication of liability to the class; the members of the class may thereafter
be required to come in individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added).
112. See Nassau Cnty., 461 F.3d at 226.
113. See id. at 226–27.
114. Id. at 227 (citing Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 449 (4th Cir.
2003)).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
116. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02 (2022).
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even the (b)(3) predominance requirement is designed to further these
goals.117 Some commentators and judges go even further by arguing that
Rule 23 is inherently flexible and permits courts to “exercise every bit of
discretionary power that the law provides.”118
By allowing classes that would otherwise fail (b)(3) to be certified under
(c)(4), the argument goes, courts—perforce—expand access to the class
action device, thereby furthering the purpose of the Rules.119 “It is a rare
case indeed” in which a class-wide resolution of the common issues would
fail to materially advance the fair and efficient resolution of the underlying
controversy.120 The alternative, under a limited (c)(4), for any case that does
not meet the predominance requirement of (b)(3) as a whole would be to
either relitigate the issues in a swarm of individual cases121 or attempt to take
advantage of some other aggregation mechanism.122 Neither option is as
effective as resolving the common issues in one fell swoop on a class-wide
basis.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, many of these cases will not in fact be
litigated separately, in multidistrict litigation, or through any other means.123
Instead, the plaintiffs’ rights will simply remain unvindicated. A limited
(c)(4), therefore, actively goes against the purpose of the Rules and the class
action device by dooming the justice system to these twin evils: duplicative
proceedings and reduced access to courts.
These arguments have proven so popular that, as of the writing of this
Comment, they are hardly needed. “Most leading scholars”124 subscribe to
the expansive reading of (c)(4).125 While some are cautious,126 others point
to the “weakness” and even the disappearance of the (c)(4) circuit split.127
Despite this, some scholars still call for a limited (c)(4) and caution their
colleagues that the ground on which they stand is less firm than it may appear.
The foremost among these scholars has been Professor Laura J. Hines.

117. See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Implicit
in the satisfaction of the predominance test is the notion that the adjudication of common
issues will help achieve judicial economy.”).
118. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 868 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2351, 2379 (2006).
119. See Bronte et al., supra note 96; see also Romberg, supra note 22, at 289.
120. Romberg, supra note 22, at 296.
121. See id. at 258.
122. See id. at 301–13 (discussing alternatives to class action).
123. See id. at 301 (“If a vast number of plaintiffs with relatively small claims cannot
aggregate their interests, transaction costs serve as an effective barrier to justice; claims are
never filed, not because they lack merit, but due to power imbalance in the litigation market.”).
124. Bronte et al., supra note 96, at 745.
125. See, e.g., 7AA KANE, supra note 17, § 1790.
126. See Frederico, supra note 84, at 276–77.
127. See generally Bronte et al., supra note 96.
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B. Housekeeping Tool: The Limited Interpretation of (c)(4)
Across several articles128 championing a limited interpretation of (c)(4),
Hines argues that understanding the true meaning and purpose of (c)(4) is not
as simple as the “expansivists” claim.129 Rather than attempting to wring
meaning from the singular sentence contained in the subsection, which has
been characterized as “ambiguous,”130 “opaque,”131 “vague,”132
“confus[ing],”133 and “unhelpful”134 even by the allies of the expansive
reading, Hines turns instead to the legislative history of Rule 23 for hints as
to the subsection’s intended meaning.135 Upon concluding that the
legislative history supports a limited reading of (c)(4),136 Hines turns to its
recent application, arguing that some of the authorities commonly cited in
support of an expansive (c)(4) do not actually apply it in the cases before
them.137 Both points are discussed below.
The legislative history of Rule 23(c)(4) supports a modest purpose at best
and points to a complete lack of purpose at worst, argues Hines.138 Over fifty
years ago, the drafters of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 were not debating the
subsection’s broad potential.139 Instead, they questioned whether the
provision was not “simply too trivial to warrant inclusion in the rule at all.”140
Advisory Committee Member Charles Alan Wright urged that it be stricken
as unnecessary.141 In response, Advisory Committee Reporter Benjamin
Kaplan, conceding that (c)(4) made “obvious points” and merely reflected
existing Rule 23 practice, nevertheless argued that its inclusion would be

128. See generally Hines, supra note 10.
129. See Hines, supra note 46, at 628–29 (“As Rule 23(c)(4)’s decades-long journey from
obscurity to renaissance amply demonstrates, this chameleonic provision simply cannot be
understood through the plain meaning of its text.”).
130. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 133 (2015) (conceding
that Rule 23(c)(4) “is ambiguous, and does not explain when an issue class is appropriate”).
131. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 385 (2005).
132. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 238–39 (2003) (opining that Rule 23(c)(4) contemplates
“some manner of slicing and dicing” within a larger litigation, yet provides no guidance as to
“[w]hat slicing and dicing is nonetheless ‘appropriate’”).
133. Klonoff, supra note 41, at 764.
134. Dodson, supra note 118, at 2372.
135. See Hines, supra note 46, at 628–29.
136. See id. at 627 (“[N]either a textualist nor an intentionalist interpretation of (c)(4)
allows its application as an end-run around (b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”).
137. See id. at 628 (rejecting the premise that a “uniform understanding” of 23(c)(4)
presently exists among the circuits).
138. See Hines, supra note 104, at 719–20.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 719 (citing Letter from Charles Alan Wright, Member, Advisory Comm. on
Civ. Rules, to Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 3 (Mar. 30, 1963),
in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, 1935–1988 (1991), microformed on CIS No. CI-7001-41 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).
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“useful for the sake of clarity and completeness.”142 These exchanges, points
out Hines, are ill-befitting of a supposedly game-changing provision.143
The subsection’s placement within Rule 23, in Hines’s view, further
supports a limited reading.144 Much like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
themselves, she argues, the “functionally unique” subsections of Rule 23 are
organized in an “essentially linear path,” guiding the reader from the initial
stages of litigation to its conclusion.145 Rule 23, therefore, begins with a
“Prerequisites” section, which sets out the four criteria that every class action
must meet: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.146 These
prerequisites are followed by a section outlining the three types of class
actions that may be certified—provided that the requirements of both 23(a)
and any additional requirements of this section are met.147 Under this theory,
sections (a) and (b) contain the whole universe of certification possibilities
and must be satisfied before any subsequent sections of the Rule are
considered.148 Section (c), then, has nothing at all to do with class
certification, and merely contains a number of directives for the court to
follow after certifying a class, including timing of certification orders and
notice to class members.149 The sequential reading of Rule 23 has found
support in Supreme Court decisions,150 even as it has drawn criticism from
academics and courts who believe that the “unduly rigid and formalistic”151
interpretation runs afoul of “the flexibility inherent in Rule 23.”152
Hines further argues that the dispute around (c)(4) is far from settled,
despite the Rule 23 Subcommittee recently coming to the contrary

142. Id. at 719–20 (citing Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory
Comm. on Civ. Rules, and Albert M. Sacks, Member, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules on
Additional Points on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of March 15, 1963 5 (Sept.
12, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 1935–1988 (1991), microformed on CIS No. CI-7001-52 (Cong.
Info. Serv.)).
143. See id.
144. See id. at 731–32.
145. See id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349, 361–62 (2011)).
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
147. See id. at 23(b).
148. See Hines, supra note 104, at 731–32 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 621 (1997)).
149. See id. at 732–33.
150. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 360–67 (engaging in detailed structural analysis
of Rule 23); Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 619–21.
151. See Hines, supra note 104, at 734–35.
152. See Dodson, supra note 118, at 2379; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 868 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that trial courts have authority with regard to
Rule 23 “to exercise every bit of discretionary power that the law provides”).
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conclusion.153 The Fifth Circuit, Hines points out,154 which had originally
planted the seeds of the split with its explicit rejection of an expansive (c)(4)
in Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,155 has not only failed to overturn the
case, but has reiterated its view in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Co.156
Furthermore, Hines argues, a close examination of the cases that voice
general support for an expansive (c)(4) reveals that none of the other circuits
have “actually approved certification of an issue class action that failed Rule
23(b)(3) predominance as a whole.”157 For example, in spite of its embrace
of an expansive (c)(4), the Ninth Circuit in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc.158 ended up vacating and remanding the action upon finding that the
district court had “abused its discretion by not adequately considering the
predominance requirement before certifying the class.”159 Likewise, despite
the Fourth Circuit’s strong rhetoric in Gunnells, the class that was ultimately
certified satisfied (b)(3) predominance.160 These cases demonstrate that,
despite the Subcommittee’s assurances, the circuit split yet lives, and courts
on both sides of it appear wary of actually utilizing (c)(4)’s supposed broad
power.
III. A NECESSARY END TO THE ANOMALOUS ISSUE CLASS
It is easy to see why the popularity of the expansive (c)(4) is on the rise.
The anomalous issue class has the potential to completely circumvent the
restrictions placed upon mass injury classes by Amchem161 and revitalize the
wounded Rule 23.162 It expands access to justice while promoting judicial
efficiency.163 There is a lot to like about an expansive (c)(4). However, the
mere fact that a device might be beneficial does not render it permissible
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Decades of confusion
153. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 90–91 (Nov.
5-6,
2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/4SR7-RGAK] (“The
various circuits seem to be in accord about the propriety of such [issue class action] treatment
‘[w]hen appropriate,’ as Rule 23(c)(4) now says.”). Furthermore, the Committee’s most
recent agenda book has no mention of any planned Rule 23(c)(4) action. See Meeting of the
Advisory
Committee
on
Civil
Rules
(Mar.
29,
2022),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11-civil-agenda_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CG62-5PA6].
154. Hines, supra note 46, at 635.
155. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). While some commentators have argued that both
decisions’ rejection of the expansive (c)(4) is mere dicta, see Bronte et al., supra note 96, at
747–48, these arguments are hard to square with the direct language used by the Fifth Circuit.
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 (“[S]uch an attempt to ‘manufacture predominance through the
nimble use of subdivision (c)(4)’ is precisely what Castano forbade.” (quoting Castano, 84
F.3d at 745–46 n.21)).
157. Hines, supra note 46, at 636.
158. 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
159. See id. at 1234.
160. See Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 443 (4th Cir. 2003).
161. See supra text accompanying note 84.
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 115–123.

2022]

THE ANOMALOUS ISSUE CLASS

133

surrounding the subsection have convincingly demonstrated that (c)(4) is
not—as some courts claim—amenable to a plain-meaning analysis.164 The
legislative history of the Rule and the subsection create even more problems
for the expansive reading, clearly demonstrating that the drafters of the
modern Rule sought to streamline—not upend—centuries of class action
practice.165 Lastly, this Comment argues that continued indulgence of the
anomalous issue class endangers both plaintiffs and defendants.
A. What Plain Meaning?
While it may be tempting to look to the text of the current (c)(4)166—or
for that matter the text of the pre-2007 (c)(4)167—and point out the textual
support for an expansive reading, this approach overlooks several critical
points. Perhaps the most important of these is that Rule 23(c)(4) has been
around in essentially its current form since the 1966 amendments.168 Despite
this, the subsection had remained largely unutilized until the 1980s.169
Following a brief rise in interest by courts looking to bypass the strictures of
(b)(3) predominance,170 the expansive (c)(4) was cast back into the shadows
in the mid-1990s, when a wave of mass tort cases seeking easy certification
under (c)(4) crashed against the rocks of federal appellate resistance.171
There it remained until its present reemergence into the spotlight.172 This
patchwork history belies any attempt to argue that the meaning of (c)(4) may
be definitively ascertained from its text alone.
Looking beyond the text, the history of (c)(4) offers even less support for
an expansive reading. Far from treating (c)(4) as the powerful class
certification device its proponents claim it to be, the drafters of the modern
Rule 23 had no idea the Rule would have the impact it did.173 Arthur Miller,
who was in the room when Rule 23 was written, insists that “nothing was in
the committee’s mind.”174 Turning to subsection (c)(4), the only question on
the Committee’s mind seems to have been whether to include such an

164. Hines, supra note 104, at 731 (“Indeed, 23(c)(4)’s decades-long journey from oblivion
to rediscovery and from rejection to adoption makes it difficult to sustain the contention that
its text may be interpreted solely by reference to its ‘plain meaning.’”).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 138–143.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues.”).
167. See supra text accompanying note 107.
168. See Hines, supra note 104, at 724–25 (exploring the varying application of (c)(4) since
its enactment in 1966).
169. See id. at 724.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 725.
172. See id. at 725–26.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 56–66.
174. Testimony of Arthur Miller, Public Hearing: Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, at 64 (Jan. 17, 1997), in 3 WORKING PAPERS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R2JLP8F].
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obvious provision at all.175 Indeed, the very purpose of the 1966
amendments was to “craft a cleaner, more flexible rule that better reflected
how some courts had begun to use the class action device.”176 While,
concededly, one of the goals of the amendments was to “enable future
judicial experimentation with collective claims processing,”177 it is likely
that the drafters envisioned the sort of experimentation that courts engaged
in under the 1938 Rule: finding ways to bend strict categories in pursuit of
justice,178 not creating novel class types through clever use of obscure
provisions. Given that the modern issue class has no equivalent in either the
1938 version of Rule 23179 or in prior class action practice,180 it would be
dubious at best to view this drastic shift from past practice as the drafters’
intent.
B. The Danger of the Anomalous Issue Class
The idea of a class action did not spring up overnight. Rule 23’s
ideological roots can be traced as far back as bills of peace issued by English
courts of equity, from whence the idea of the class action first spread onto
American soil.181 Over time, the ideas evolved and were eventually codified
into the Rule we know today.182 Certain ideas, however, have proven to be
fundamental to the very concept of a class action, and as a result have stood
the test of time.183 This “class action core” is three-fold. First is the idea of
commonality—those who seek a court’s indulgence in certifying a class must
demonstrate that there is enough in common between the parties for class
treatment to be worthwhile.184 The second is that of superiority—before the
“usual rule”185 may be dispensed with, a reason must be shown for invoking
the class action exception.186 Third is the idea of adequate representation—
due process requires that, even in the limited circumstances where class
adjudication is appropriate, there must be a party present who can and does

175. See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.
176. Marcus, supra note 1, at 604.
177. Id. at 605.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 31–36.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 24–30.
180. See West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721–23 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820).
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See supra Parts I.A., I.B.
183. Compare supra note 17, and accompanying text, with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) and
TOPIC EE: TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS—RULE
23, at EE–2 (1962), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No.
CI-6309-44 (Cong. Info Serv.).
184. Compare West, 29 F. Cas. at 722 (“[W]here the question is of general interest, and a
few may sue for the benefit of the whole . . . .”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b) (requiring
there to be issues common to the class as well as additional grounds to demonstrate that the
case is amenable to class adjudication).
185. See supra text accompanying note 13.
186. Compare West, 29 F. Cas. at 723 (listing possible reasons for dispensing with the
general rule), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that the class action be “superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”).
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in fact represent the interests of those absent before the latter can be bound
by the resulting judgement.187
The proponents of an expansive (c)(4) and the anomalous issue class
threaten to upend all three of the central concepts by shifting the focus from
the entire case to discrete issues.188 This myopic view is an anomaly—a
loose thread in the broader tapestry that is the class action. The courts of
equity, which originated the class action, did so in the context of vindicating
rights.189 Likewise, courts applying the 1938 Rule were primarily concerned
with the vindication of the plaintiffs’ rights.190 Predictably, the drafters of
the 1966 Rule also viewed it as a way for “small people” to vindicate their
rights.191 It was not until the 1980s, when courts sought to surpass the outer
limits of (b)(3), that anyone envisioned the issue, rather than the class, as the
“relevant unit” of class litigation.192 This reductionist view of the class
action device is short-sighted and destructive.
Selectively addressing only the common issues does not do away with the
rest of the claim—it merely blinds the certifying court to the consequences
of its rulings. Once the certified issues are resolved, the action is concluded,
so far as the certifying court is concerned,193 but the claims do not disappear.
Former class members go—ruling in hand—to other courts to try the rest of
their claim.194 Different courts apply different law to different facts, building
upon the certifying court’s foundation in ways the latter could never have
foreseen. This is the “novel and wholly untested theory” problem that the
Castano court grappled with, reproduced on a much larger scale.195 Rule 23
operates under the assumption that the certifying court is able to foresee the
general progression of the case.196 It is unlikely, however, that a court tasked
with considering only a limited number of common issues will be able to
foresee how its rulings will shape downstream litigation in other courtrooms

187. Compare West, 29 F. Cas. at 722 (“[T]he court . . . is satisfied with bringing so many
before it, as may be considered as fairly representing that right, and honestly contesting in
behalf of the whole, and therefore binding, in a sense, that right.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)
(adequate representation). See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (discussing
the requirement of adequate representation).
188. See Romberg, supra note 22, at 252 (“We are now in the age of the issue.”).
189. See West, 29 F. Cas. at 723.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 24–36.
191. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 599–600.
192. See Romberg, supra note 22, at 252.
193. See id. at 251.
194. See id.
195. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). The court stated:
The district court’s predominance inquiry, or lack of it, squarely presents the
problems associated with certification of immature torts. Determining whether the
common issues are a “significant” part of each individual case has an abstract quality
to it when no court in this country has ever tried an injury-as-addiction claim. As
the plaintiffs admitted to the district court, “we don’t have the learning curb [sic]
that is necessary to say to Your Honor ‘this is precisely how this case can be tried
and that will not run afoul of the teachings of the 5th Circuit.’”
Id. at 749 (internal citations omitted).
196. See id.
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and under different systems of law.197 By encouraging courts to certify the
otherwise-uncertifiable, proponents of the expansive (c)(4) and the
anomalous issue class are effectively seeking to create an end-run not only
around predominance, but also around the three-fold core of class action
requirements.198 Simply put, it is impossible for the certifying court to know
definitively—at the time of certification—whether the anomalous issue class
before it demonstrates sufficient commonality, superiority, and adequacy of
representation199 to be certified. The true and final answer to whether these
prerequisites of certification were satisfied will not be known until individual
litigation takes place downstream—much too late for the certifying court to
course-correct or decertify.200 Such uncertainty is ill-befitting of the class
action device, which requires courts to take an active role in managing the
class actions before it.201 No amount of efficiency is worth the risk created
by the unpredictable and uncontrollable tide of downstream litigation.
The consequence of certifying a class that—in retrospect—turns out to be
improper is the resulting judgment’s inability to bind absent parties.202
Taken to its logical conclusion, the anomalous issue class—the loose
thread—has the potential to unravel the entire class action tapestry. The
promise of global res judicata—its most powerful tool203—would ring
hollow if parties knew that subsequent developments could well render their
class retroactively improper. The Second Circuit’s fears in Stephenson v.
Dow Chemical Co.204 would pale in comparison to the uncertainty unleashed
by the anomalous issue class. The ultimate victims of this reckless approach
will be the “small people” who suddenly find their claims precluded by the
actions of far-away “representatives” who had in fact failed to represent their
interests and courts which had failed to inquire further, and whose settlement

197. But see Romberg, supra note 22, at 251–52.
198. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where—for example—a schism in the interests
of an outwardly cohesive class is not revealed until the application of varying bodies of state
law to individual issues in the litigation makes it apparent—long after the certifying court had
washed its hands of the matter. The risk is further heightened where the theory underlying the
claim is novel. See supra note 195. Under current precedent, this theoretical class would have
been uncertifiable at the outset, see generally Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249
(2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (reconsidering the Agent
Orange Settlement in light of plaintiffs’ claim that they were not adequately represented in the
original action), but the uncertain nature of the anomalous issue class renders the certifying
court less capable of foreseeing these issues at the outset and wholly unable to unwind the
state court rulings premised on the resulting mistaken certifications.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 181–187; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b)
(providing additional requirements for certification).
200. See supra text accompanying note 193.
201. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)–(h) (instructing the certifying court on such matters as
conducting the action, approving a settlement, as well as appointing and paying class counsel).
202. See, e.g., Stephenson, 273 F.3d 249.
203. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 824 (1999) (“Continental
conditioned its part in any settlement on a guarantee of ‘total peace,’ ensuring no unknown
future liabilities.”); supra note 68 (noting the pressure that class certification places on
defendants to settle).
204. 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
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values will be affected by the uncertainty and risk inherent in the anomalous
issue class.
It is for these reasons that the claim must be viewed as the relevant unit of
class litigation and the expansive (c)(4) must be rejected in favor of a limited,
historically consistent reading. Rule 23, as it currently stands, has no place
for the anomalous issue class.
CONCLUSION
Following the fall of the modern class action, courts and commentators
have increasingly turned to Rule 23(c)(4) as a vehicle for circumventing the
strict predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and breathing life back into
the ailing device. Currently, the expansive interpretation of (c)(4)—which
permits issue classes to be certified even where the claim as a whole would
have failed (b)(3) predominance—is dominant. The proponents of this
approach hail it as a long-awaited increase in judicial efficiency and
revitalization of mass tort victims’ access to the device. The view, however,
must be rejected as a dangerous historical anomaly. By focusing on only the
issues presented before them, certifying courts abdicate responsibility for
guiding the development of the whole case and ensuring that the rights and
interests of the absent class members are adequately represented.
This Comment, however, does not argue that no issue class could ever be
appropriate. Indeed, the device’s potential for reducing duplicative litigation,
if used appropriately, is enormous. However, given the ambiguity of the
current (c)(4) and the history of the class action device, such change cannot
be enacted by judicial fiat. Instead, it should be enacted through proper
rulemaking procedures following the full consideration and weighing of its
impact. The anomaly must be studied, and its useful features should be
integrated into the class action tapestry.

